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It is now commonplace in theoretical linguistics for bitter disputes to rage between the adherents 
of this school or that. By contrast, over the past quarter of a century, comparative/historical studies 
have managed to progress in a solid, quieter manner; that is, until recently when the huge 
controversy erupted surrounding Joseph Greenberg’s American Indian classification. The 
controversy concerning this classification, which has been viewed as everything from a stroke of 
genius to an intellectual scandal, has not only upset the tranquility of American historical 
linguistics, raising anew fundamental questions of methodology and principles of classification, 
but it has also spilled over into the general scientific and popular press. 
The purpose of this report is first to summarize the events of the past four or five years, so that 
the reader can be brought up to date on what has transpired. Then I would like to discuss the issues 
involved, hopefully getting past the acrimonious argumentation and personality conflicts, in order 
to clarify the real linguistic issues that are in dispute. Before beginning, let me say that the battle 
lines between the pro-Greenberg and anti-Greenberg forces have been drawn so rigidly that it is 
difficult to find anyone familiar with the controversy who could be considered impartial enough to 
describe it in an objective way. Not being an Americanist with a vested interest in the outcome of 
the debate, I believe that I am in a position to provide a balanced and informative report; 
nevertheless it is only fair that I acknowledge that I do consider myself a disciple of Greenberg in 
the African linguistics sphere and thus am personally and intellectually sympathetic to him.  
The background  
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The major thesis of Greenberg’s classification, expounded in his book, Language in the Americas, 
published in 1987 by Stanford University Press, is that the languages of the New World, which 
previously had been classified conservatively into some 150 or so distinct families, fall into three 
stocks or macro-families. The first is Eskimo-Aleut, a non-controversial family made up of a 
group of more-or-less closely related languages spread from the Bering Straits to Greenland. The 
second is Na-Dene. This family, which consists of the widespread Athabaskan group plus the 
Eyak, Tlingit, and Haida languages of the Canadian northwest coast, was proposed more than half 
a century ago by Edward Sapir (1915). Although not all linguists accept the validity of Na-Dene 
— perhaps a majority do not — the proposal is hardly radical. Greenberg’s third stock is Amerind, 
a huge group consisting of all the other North American Indian languages plus all the languages of 
Middle and South America. As should be obvious, it is this Amerind family that has caused the 
greatest furor. 
The debate over Greenberg’s new classification began not with the publication of his book, 
but rather with an article that appeared a year earlier in Current Anthropology, an article in which 
correlations between Greenberg’s three macro-families and new findings about the genetics and 
dentition of New World populations were discussed (Greenberg, Turner, and Zegura 1986). This 
article was significant in two respects. First, it initiated a chain of events in which the evaluation 
of Greenberg’s linguistic hypothesis became inextricably mixed with anthropological questions 
about the prehistoric peopling of the New World. Specifically, the classification became tied to a 
theory of a threefold migration from Asia across the Bering land bridge to account for the 
settlement of the Americas. Second, in the accompanying commentary it contained the unfortunate 
remark by Lyle Campbell (p. 488) that Greenberg’s classification should be “shouted down”, 
thereby setting the confrontational tone of the ensuing debate.1 The image of outraged American 
Indianists shouting down seventy-five year old Joseph Greenberg was encouraged by the popular 
scientific press, which, for journalistic ends, chose to portray the differences between Greenberg 
and his critics not as a normal scholarly disagreement, but as a scientific war between opposing 
camps (see Lewin 1988, for example).  
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It is worth noting, by the way, that although the present controversy could be said to have 
begun with the 1986 Current Anthropology article, the broad classificatory scheme is much older. 
In the period around 1960, Greenberg (1960),  Sidney Lamb (1959), and Morris Swadesh (1960) 
each suggested — presumably independently — that the New World languages all  fell into just 
three stocks. In all three papers, the proposal was simply mentioned as a likelihood without 
supporting data. In a long footnote (p. 47, n. 13), Lamb went on to point out that the three stock 
idea was not original with him (nor with Greenberg or Swadesh), but rather had roots going back 
to the early 1800s.2 
Greenberg’s book appeared in 1987 and almost immediately received a Current Anthropology 
book review (Greenberg and respondents 1987), which consists of a number of short reviews by 
different authors.3 Some of the reviewers were positive, but many  were not, including Ives 
Goddard, an eminent Americanist, who “rejected it angrily”, to use Greenberg’s words (Greenberg 
1990:7). Greenberg’s characterization of Goddard’s review is indicative of the general climate of 
the ongoing debate, since in my reading of it, I find it deprecatory and dismissive, rather than 
angry. If one wants to find anger and outrage, one need only turn to Lyle Campbell’s diatribe, 
which was published as a review article in Language the following year (Campbell 1988). 
Whatever the validity of Campbell’s specific criticisms, the tone of his review manifested a 
stridency that went far beyond the norm of academic linguistic journals. Another unfortunate 
event in coloring the nature of the intellectual exchange was the contribution in Language a few 
years later by James Matisoff, a renowned scholar in the Southeast Asian field (Matisoff 1990). 
According to the editor’s note, this review commentary was invited to provide a neutral 
perspective on the dispute. However, in place of an insightful analysis, which one would have 
expected from a scholar of Matisoff’s stature, the author provided a cutesy piece in which 
Greenberg and all other scholars who do long range comparison were subjected to ridicule. As one 
can imagine, harsh criticism has not been entirely one-sided. Greenberg has also not minced words 
in pointing out his opponents’ flaws and in questioning their abilities, the gist of which is that they 
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know nothing at all about classification and that with their stated methodological rules of 
evidence, they wouldn’t even be able to establish a family as clear-cut as Indo-European! 
Two other publications around this time can be said to have indirectly added fuel to the fire, 
namely Ruhlen (1987), a basic reference work on the world’s languages, and Cavalli-Sforza et al. 
(1988) , an innovative study by a highly respected geneticist comparing linguistic and genetic data 
around the globe. What is striking about both these works is that they take Greenberg’s new and 
still hypothetical American Indian classification as a given. This leads us to an understanding of 
the intense feeling of Greenberg’s critics and the rationale for it. The essence of the objection is 
not just that the classification is all wrong and that the book is fundamentally unsound, factually 
and methodologically. Equally important is that the book was written by Greenberg and 
consequently would acquire an instant credibility it didn’t deserve, if not among linguists, then by 
anthropologists and prehistorians. If Language in the Americas  had been written by some 
unknown scholar without an established reputation, or if Greenberg were known to be a crackpot, 
then the book would probably have been ignored, with perhaps a minor review appearing here or 
there. But Greenberg is not a crackpot; he is a world-class scholar—in my opinion one of the 
major linguists of the 20th century—whose impressive contributions to such fields as African 
linguistics and universal typology are indisputable. Moreover, when one looks at other 
controversial, innovative proposals of his in the past, he almost always has turned out to be right. 
Thus we see the sense of frustration on the part of Goddard and Campbell, and many other serious, 
data-oriented Americanists, such as Wallace Chafe, Terrence Kaufman, and Marianne Mithun, 
who feel that they are now going to be obliged to waste their valuable time disproving what they 
consider to be a totally unsubstantiated piece of hogwash. 
In March, 1990, Allan Taylor of the University of Colorado, Boulder organized a conference, 
sponsored by the National Endowment for the Humanities, to discuss Greenberg’s classification 
and the controversy it had engendered. Many of the major players were there, including Greenberg 
and Ruhlen on one side and Campbell and Kaufman, along with other Americanists, on the other.4 
Among the participants were general comparative linguists who had a special interest in 
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substantive or methodological issues concerning matters of classification and also many non-
linguists—archaeologists, physical anthropologists, and human geneticists. It was among the non-
linguists that Greenberg found the strongest backing for his three migration theory and by 
implication for his three-way linguistic classification. Ironically, as I needled Greenberg in a 
recently published interview (Newman 1991), the success of his African classification had 
depended critically on ignoring the racial and historical factors that had misled previous scholars, 
and now the major support for his American Indian classification was coming not from an 
examination of the linguistic data per se but from its fit with migration scenarios. 
The intermingling of Greenberg’s language classification with the work of non-linguists had 
an important consequence: the issue moved beyond the world of specialists in American Indian 
linguistics and became of interest to a broader scientific and popular community. Thus, following 
the Boulder meeting began what one could call the media blitz. The controversy surrounding 
Greenberg’s classification and its implications for New World settlement theories was covered by 
stories in Science  (Morell 1990), Science News  (Bower 1990a, Bower 1990b), Nature (Diamond 
1990), and the New Scientist  (Lewin 1990), as well as by scattered newspapers from San 
Francisco to Dallas. In a large sense the fears of Greenberg’s critics had proved justified: whether 
Greenberg was right or wrong, his classificatory scheme was being disseminated widely. 
As if this weren’t enough, Greenberg’s classification and  his particular methodological 
approach acquired extensive coverage in a second, apparently unrelated, media event: sudden 
attention to the reconstruction of Mother Tongue (or Proto-Human), the establishment of large 
families such as Nostratic, and the scientific and personal status of long range comparison in 
linguistics. In a one year period, these topics were the subject of feature articles in three quite 
different mass circulation magazines: U.S. News and World Report (Allman 1990), Scientific 
American  (Ross 1991), and The Atlantic Monthly (Wright 1991). The Scientific American article 
contained a large photo of Greenberg whereas The Atlantic Monthly went one better and included 
a prominent three-quarter page line drawing: Greenberg had clearly become a scientific celebrity. 
The negative side of the coin, however, is that Greenberg was portrayed not as the solid linguist 
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that he is (leaving his American Indian work aside for the moment) but as an iconoclast whose 
approach put him somewhere to the left of the crazies. 
The issues 
As should be clear by now, streams of words have been exchanged about Greenberg’s American 
Indian classification, some spoken in haste by pro- or anti-Greenberg forces, others penned by 
non-linguistically trained staff writers. In such circumstances, a lot of misinformation has been 
bandied about. What I would like to do now is try to clarify some of the real issues as I see them, 
avoiding, if possible, hyperbole and rhetoric. In the interest of conciseness, I shall limit myself to 
three general areas of disagreement. I won’t offer a firm opinion as to the correctness of 
Greenberg’s classification per se, but I will take the liberty of offering my views about the validity 
of specific arguments that have been raised. 
1. The first issue is the soundness of Greenberg’s method of mass comparison (or multilateral 
comparison, as he now prefers to call it), whereby classification is based on a broad inspection of 
basic vocabulary in a large number of languages. This issue actually breaks down into two sub-
issues: (a) methodological and (b) epistemological.  
(a) Greenberg’s critics argue that his method is patently unsound since surface similarities 
cannot be the underpinnings of a serious classification, the main reason being that there is no way 
to distinguish real cognates from loanwords on the one hand or areal features or accidental 
similarities on the other. They argue instead for the application of the Comparative Method, i.e. 
the establishment of regular correspondences and the systematic reconstruction of proto-forms, as 
the only solid methodological means of setting up language families.5 By ignoring these strictures, 
Greenberg’s methodology has been characterized in the general scientific press as unorthodox, 
innovative, and very radical. I would suggest that whereas Greenberg’s American Indian 
classification as such may deserve to be characterized as audacious and heretical, his 
methodology, in principle at least, is really commonsensical. (In the case of his earlier African 
classification, it led to remarkably successful results, see Newman Forthcoming.)  In the Scientific 
American article, mass comparison, viewed as a new, radical approach, is contrasted with the 
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Comparative Method: “If the Nostraticists bend the rules of the game, Greenberg and his group 
break them” (Ross 1991:145). But where did these supposed rules come from?  As Greenberg has 
correctly pointed out, none of the important work on Indo-European over the past two centuries in 
which the Comparative Method was employed was designed to prove or thought essential to the 
establishment of Indo-European as a phylogenetic family. Similarly, the relationship of Bantu 
languages to one another preceded by a long time the beginning of systematic phonological and 
lexical comparison of languages in that family, and the same could equally be said for Semitic. 
The fact is, the Comparative Method exists primarily for non-classificatory  purposes, namely to 
reconstruct aspects of a proto-language and to come to an understanding of linguistic changes and 
developments that have taken place in a family throughout the course of its history.6 One could 
argue that Greenberg’s method, rather than being radical, is really a throwback to the old-
fashioned, and sometimes mistaken, approach of  late 18th and early 19th century philologists, 
whose assertion of relationships, such as between Sanskrit, Latin, and Greek or between Hebrew 
and Arabic, derived from the simple observation of surface similarities in vocabulary and 
grammar. 
The criticism of mass comparison for not being able to distinguish true cognates from 
loanwords or accidentally similar forms is also due to a lack of understanding of the essence of 
Greenberg’s method. Greenberg would agree that in comparing lists of words from two disparate 
languages, one couldn’t always tell what was significant and what was not; but that is not the way 
he proposes that one should operate. The reason one compares many languages at once, rather 
than proceeding in pair-wise fashion, is just so that one can see patterns of similarities and 
configurations of interlocking similarities that one group of languages exhibits as opposed to some 
other language or group of languages. (Specialists in bats or elephants or dolphins might not see 
that these beings share a family in common — they might not even think of asking the question — 
but the kind of broad-brush approach Greenberg advocates is supposed to allow him to recognize 
such relationships.)  All historical linguists are of course aware that in comparing individual 
languages, regular phonological correspondences are more valuable than scattered surface 
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resemblances, which can be accidental and misleading. The essence of Greenberg’s approach, 
which traditional comparativists often overlook, is that when enough languages are taken into 
account, surface similarities may show up to an extent  greater than one would expect by chance 
and thus provide a key to historical linguistic connections. Mass comparison is powerful and 
effective, so Greenberg would contend, because when the data from a broad array of languages are 
assembled, the languages almost separate themselves into groups.  
But do they really?  Given a comparative word list of some 50 items for some 100 American 
Indian languages, are the natural groupings really so obvious that an Eric Hamp or an Ives 
Goddard would come up with exactly the same classification that Greenberg would?  If not, one 
has to ask the question whether a method that can only be applied by one person really qualifies to 
be called a method. In short, one wonders whether Greenberg has deluded himself into thinking 
that he has a rigorous method when instead he has something that most of us would much rather 
have, namely insight and genius!  The key question that the opponents of Greenberg’s American 
Indian hypothesis should be asking is not whether mass comparison as an ideal is sound, but 
rather whether his classification really derives from an application of the method in its pristine 
form. As best as I can determine, Greenberg has not presented unequivocal evidence of this in 
Language in the Americas. One does not, for example, find a multilateral basic vocabulary table 
for New World languages comparable to the one he provides  for European languages (table 7, p. 
24). Instead, as evidentiary support for his classification, he offers lists of cognate sets, and in so 
doing leaves himself open to the critical standards normally applied to such lists. We all know that 
if you look at enough words in enough languages with an allowable range of phonological and 
semantic variation, you cannot help but find matching items. (There is a good-sized list of 
supposed Hamitic etymologies at the back of Meinhof’s Die Sprachen der Hamiten (1912), which, 
with hindsight, we now know to be totally worthless.) But this is hardly what Greenberg intends 
by the method of mass comparison. A major difficulty in evaluating Greenberg’s hypothesis — 
whether one’s personal leaning is in the direction of confirmation or refutation — is that the 
supporting data, especially the etymological sets, probably do not reflect the real evidence that led 
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Greenberg to classify the languages the way that he did. While the idea of mass comparison of 
vocabulary conjures up some kind of quantitative method, it is really an immersion technique in 
which after looking at huge quantities of data from language after language, one begins to develop 
a sense of what is diagnostic for one group as opposed to another. Although vocabulary is 
inevitably given prominence, by Greenberg and others, in methodological discussions on mass 
comparison, in practice Greenberg has always accorded great importance to grammatical 
similarities in his works on classification. This was true in his successful African linguistic 
classification, and his American Indian classification is no exception (see Liedtke 1989). The 
diagnostic items — which might be three detailed grammatical features and five specific lexical 
items — are what really matter if one wants to think in terms of a discovery method. All the other 
stuff—the long lists with, according to his critics, elementary transcription errors, mistaken 
morphological analyses, and false cognates—are simply there to try to convince the reader of what 
Greenberg is already sure of (and which, given his track record, may be so).  
(b) This takes us to the epistemological question which lies at the heart of the dispute between 
Greenberg and his critics. The opponents insist that Greenberg’s classification, especially his 
putative Amerind family, lacks proof. Some assert — erroneously I would contend — that  
relationships that go back further than 7,000 to 10,000 years can never be proved satisfactorily, 
and for Amerind, if it exists, one would be dealing with a time depth of double or triple that 
amount.7 Be that as it may, the critics all seem to agree that Greenberg has failed to provide the 
essential proof to substantiate Amerind as a valid group. Greenberg’s response is that the notion of 
proof is specious and the assumption that languages should automatically be treated as unrelated 
unless demonstrated otherwise is unwarranted. The objective in classification is not to prove this 
or that, but rather, given all the available evidence, to evaluate two competing hypotheses: (a) that 
languages x, y and z are related, or (b) that languages x, y and z are not related. As Lamb 
(1964:107) commented many years ago, “ [I]t is not safe to assume that any two languages are 
unrelated. For a truly meaningful classification, it is just as bad to leave apart two related groups 
as it is to put together unrelated ones.” Whereas the opponents talk about proof, hard evidence, 
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and so on, Greenberg, in a disarming way, talks of his revolutionary Amerind theory as simply 
“the best guess going”. Clearly his method cannot provide proof of the kind that would stand up in 
court or would suffice to convince a skeptical specialist, but that’s not what it is supposed to do. It 
is simply supposed to lead to classificatory hypotheses that could said to be more probable than 
the alternative proposals. In my opinion, Greenberg could be said to have won the first round of 
the epistemological debate. 
There is another level, however, at which his position is not unassailable. Scientists cannot 
spend their time testing every crazy hypothesis that comes along. If someone claims to have 
discovered a cure for stammering, but has not tested it using normal procedures and controls, 
responsible speech pathologists have a right to ignore the theory as scientifically baseless. In order 
for scientists to have their theories treated seriously, they must first meet a certain evidentiary 
“threshold” (to use a legal term). The scientist doesn’t have to “prove” that his or her theory is 
right, but the claim cannot simply be asserted devoid of appropriate supporting data. Many of 
Greenberg’s critics insist that his “best guess hypothesis” on the Amerind stock is really a 
factually empty assertion constructed on meaningless look-alikes, faulty analyses, and 
misunderstood or mistaken data, whereas Greenberg and his supporters feel that the evidence he 
cites, while imperfect, is still quite compelling. I personally am not qualified to venture an opinion 
as to which side is factually right; but I would contend that the proper epistemological way to view 
the matter is as a threshold question. The arguments going back and forth about proof have been 
and will continue to be totally fruitless. 
2. The second issue concerns migration theory and related matters concerning the peoples and 
peopling of the New World. The question is how relevant is the non-linguistic evidence to the 
evaluation of Greenberg’s American Indian classification. In some theoretical sense it shouldn’t 
count at all—from the time of Boas, American anthropologists, at least, have accepted the dictum 
that race, language, and culture are independent variables. In another sense, however, it does 
matter. Because the ancestors of separate language stocks represent separate language 
communities, the time, place, and number of these possible ancestors do place limits on the 
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reasonableness of specific linguistic proposals. As mentioned earlier, striking, if imperfect, 
correlations have been reported between Greenberg’s three-way linguistic classification and work 
being done in archeology, genetics, and physical anthropology that supports the three-migration 
theory, e.g. Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1989),  Rogers (1985), Schurr et al. (1990), Turner (1983), 
Williams et al. (1985),  Zegura (1984).  What is particularly significant about these works is that 
they were published independently of and based on research carried out prior to the appearance of 
Greenberg’s book.8 Even if, for sake of argument, one were to ignore the specific findings of these 
non-linguistic studies—although it is hard to imagine how one could do so—it is clear that just 
raising questions about possible settlement scenarios throws serious doubt on the reasonableness 
of the “conservative” view of Greenberg’s critics in which American Indian languages are 
classified into some 145 or more totally distinct stocks.  Not only would there had to have been at 
least 145 independent migrations across the Bering land bridge into the New World — Greenberg 
has joked about the need for a traffic controller there—but even more unlikely—and this, 
surprisingly has seldom been commented on — these 145 linguistic communities would had to 
have been spoken by totally distinct and unrelated languages while still in Asia. Whether 
Greenberg’s Amerind phylum holds together or is eventually broken down into a larger number of 
separate families, the particular situation regarding the geography and human settlement of the 
Americas makes the assertion of myriads of independent stocks numbering between one hundred 
and two hundred the truly radical proposal. Were it not for the unwarranted rule that languages not 
proved to be related should be assumed on a priori grounds to be independent and unrelated, the 
proponents of the conservative consensus regarding American Indian classification would 
themselves have a major threshold problem. 
3. The third issue concerns the factual, substantive basis of Greenberg’s classification. I would 
contend that Greenberg’s method is neither so flawed as to necessitate failure nor so powerful as 
to guarantee success. Thus the verification or refutation of Greenberg’s classification is going to 
depend ultimately not on debate and rhetoric, but on a careful analysis and interpretation of the 
linguistic evidence itself. For Greenberg’s position to be sustained, it is not necessary that all of 
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his proposed etymological sets and supposedly shared grammatical features be truly cognate, but 
his book must produce some comparisons that hold up under close scrutiny. Conversely, it is not 
incumbent on Greenberg’s critics to prove that he is wrong (any more than he has to prove that he 
is right): refutation can be achieved either by providing a convincing demonstration that 
Greenberg has failed to make a threshold case for his classification (as some reviewers have 
already claimed), or by postulating a coherent, empirically better supported alternative 
classificatory model. Whether a linguistic proposal is to be accepted really depends not on formal 
proof, but on whether the proposal bears fruit or not. As Greenberg put it some 35 years ago with 
regard to his more limited classification of Central and South American languages, “The ultimate 
test is a pragmatic one…. If the present classification is correct, it will prove its usefulness in 
future more advanced comparative investigations…. By the same token it cannot be saved by the 
most ingenious argumentation if it fails the crucial test of practice” (Greenberg 1960:793). 
In addition to objections about the historical interpretation of the cited forms, which relates to 
what is viewed as excessive semantic and phonological latitude in matching forms, Greenberg’s 
opponents have raised damning complaints about the reliability of the basic data themselves. 
Goddard, e.g., has attacked Greenberg for “his use of data that are erroneous or misanalyzed” 
(Greenberg and respondents 1987:657) and other critics have similarly pointed out what they 
consider to be error after error in his citations. These charges, if true, are clearly serious and one 
can certainly understand how they worked to undermine the American Indian specialists’ 
confidence in Greenberg’s work as a whole. It has been contended by Greenberg that the method 
of mass comparison has a built-in tolerance for error. Maybe so, but I think that there is greater 
validity in the view that mass comparison or not, a comparison of non-words can produce nothing 
but nonsense. Does this mean, then, that the Amerind family, to focus on Greenberg’s most 
tenuous proposal, is a classificatory castle built on sand, ready to tumble the next time an expert 
on Hopi or Zapotec or Mohawk finds a mistake?  Greenberg’s response to his critics has 
repeatedly been along the following lines: “Of course there are mistakes in a book of this scope; 
but, taken in the aggregate, their extent has been overexaggerated. In any case, even if you took 
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every single citation out of the book that you regarded as factually incorrect, there would still be 
ample evidence remaining to support my three-fold classification in a clear and convincing 
manner.” So, while the unreliability of basic data in a comparative linguistic work has to be 
regarded as an extremely serious matter, it still remains an open question whether the errors found 
in Greenberg’s book are such as to be fatal to his enterprise. 
 
Conclusion 
It is probably too early to predict how Greenberg’s specific proposals will fare, although if I had to 
venture an opinion, I would bet that the number of distinct families will ultimately turn out to be 
much closer to three than to a hundred and forty-five. When subjected to careful scrutiny over a 
period of time, it is possible that some of his higher-level groupings will have to be dismantled 
and that a somewhat larger number of independent phyla will have to be recognized. What we can 
say without hesitation, however, is that Greenberg’s classification has set a fire under the 
Americanist community and that this field, which can already boast a venerable tradition in 
descriptive and historical studies, is likely to see a major renaissance in the coming years. By 
stimulating an increased interest in American Indian linguistics and culture history, which is likely 
to lead to new research and far-reaching discoveries, Greenberg, the villain, might end up being 
the best friend this field has ever had.  
 
NOTES 
 
*   I am grateful to the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, Indiana University, for providing the 
travel funds to Amsterdam that enabled me to attend the conference. Detailed comments on the draft of 
the paper originally presented were kindly provided by Lyle Campbell. Clearly I have not accepted all of 
his suggestions, and just as clearly he cannot be said to endorse the points of view reflected here. 
1   Campbell and others (personal communication) have objected that his remark has been unfairly quoted 
out of context. Campbell’s comments begin: “This article is distressing” and ends with the sentence: 
“Indeed, the linguistic classification should be shouted down in order not to confuse nonspecialists or 
detract from the real contribution linguistics can make to prehistory” (p. 488, emphasis mine). I 
personally do not see the basis of the objection. Whereas Campbell probably regrets his exact choice of 
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words, his complaint about being quoted unfairly rings hollow, especially since all the evidence since 
then suggests that the phrase accurately represented (and still represents) his sentiments on the matter 
2  The most direct and influential precursor would, of course, have been Sapir, whose broad approach to 
classification (cf. Sapir 1929) led him to the postulation of distant linguistic relationships 
3   Subsequent reviews include the following: Bright (1988), Campbell (1988), Golla (1988), Adelaar 
(1989), and Liedtke (1989). 
4   For reasons that I am unaware, Ives Goddard did not attend the conference 
5   Scholars such as Lyle Campbell have been outspoken in their criticism of Greenberg’s methodology. 
The question that one needs to ask is, if their method is so superior, why is it that their own results have 
been so obviously wrong?  To my way of thinking, a classificatory methodology that leads to the 
establishment of 62 totally separate linguistic stocks for North America alone (Campbell & Mithun 
1979) can hardly be taken as an advertisement for its validity! 
6  In support of this conception of the nature of the Comparative Method, consider the remark by Calvert 
Watkins (1990:292), a solid comparativist with impeccable credentials: “As to the mystique of sound 
laws . . . Greenberg is right to quote with approbation the Africanist Paul Newman (1970[:39]): ‘The 
proof of genetic relationship does not depend on the demonstration of historical sound laws. Rather, the 
discovery of  sound laws and the reconstruction of linguistic history normally emerge from the careful 
comparison of languages already presumed to be related’.” 
7   At the Boulder meeting, Greenberg, who had endorsed a time depth of approximately 12,000 years for 
his Amerind family (Greenberg, Turner, and Zegura 1986), was bombarded with recent, but still 
controversial, evidence suggesting that human settlement of the New World went back over 30,000 
years. Although this evidence seemed embarrassing to Greenberg at the time, I would suggest that it 
actually is helpful to his position since it allows a much greater time period to account for the 
tremendous geographical spread and linguistic diversity of his Amerind phylum. 
8   As Greenberg (personal communication) has correctly pointed out, although it is a serious error to base a 
linguistic classification on non-linguistic evidence, a convergence of results between linguistic and non-
linguistic studies carried out independently does have probative value.  
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